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Grand Isle III’s Tarpon Rodeo: The Confused Seas of
OCSLA & Maritime Law in the Fifth Circuit
INTRODUCTION
Difficulty interpreting United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case
law pertaining to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) is by no
means a novel issue.1 In fact, the Fifth Circuit has confessed to this
shortcoming on more than one occasion.2 Perhaps the confusion is simply a
natural consequence of the Fifth Circuit hearing the lion’s share of admiralty
and maritime cases.3 Nevertheless, it may be easier to navigate a jon boat
through the Delacroix marsh while blindfolded than to interpret Fifth Circuit
OCSLA/maritime case law.4 With the Fifth Circuit’s amount of “maritime
judicial ink”5 and its considerable inconsistency, it is no surprise the office
aspirin bottle is empty.6

Copyright 2017, by CHRISTOPHER B. ORTTE
1. See David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s
Provisions on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice of Law: Correcting the Fifth
Circuit’s Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487 (2007); E. Stewart Spielman, Drilling
Through the Muddied Waters on the Outer Continental Shelf: An Examination of the
Fifth Circuit’s Recent Decision in Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 26 TUL. MAR. L.J.
683, 694 (2002) (“‘In each new case, a panel of this court must comb through a
bewildering array of cases that rely upon inconsistent reasoning in the hope of finding
an identical fact situation.’” (quoting Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456,
461 (5th Cir. 1992))); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Primer of Remedies on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 4 LOY. MAR. L.J. 19, 20 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 786
(5th Cir. 2009) (“The opposed positions of the district court and the panel both find
support in our case law, which we can all agree is conflicting and confusing.”); see
also Domingue v. Ocean Drilling Exploration Co., 923 F.2d 393, 393–94 (5th Cir.
1991) (“Once more we embark on a voyage through the familiar marshland area of
the law set aside for classifying the oil and gas exploration services contract as wet or
dry.”).
3. Nicole J. Dulude & Todd Greenwood, Close-Hauling Toward Simplified
Eligibility Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act: A Proposal
for Congressional Action or Judicial Clarification to Rectify Persistent Ambiguity, 35
TUL. MAR. L.J. 45, 62, 77–78 (2010).
4. A jon boat, more commonly known in south Louisiana as a “flat-bottom” is
a small boat generally constructed with aluminum used for various shallow water
activities such as fishing or hunting. See wikipedia.org/wiki/Jon_boat [https:
//perma.cc/8AJG-ZR58]. Delacroix Island, Louisiana, is a small fishing community
located southeast of New Orleans, Louisiana in St. Bernard Parish. See
wikipedia.org/wiki/Delacroix_Island,_Louisiana [https://perma.cc/FZ85-MRKN].
5. Dulude & Greenwood, supra note 3, at 77.
6. The prevalence of headaches amongst maritime lawyers has been discussed
in Julia M. Adams & Karen K. Milhollin, Indemnity on the Outer Continental Shelf—
A Practical Matter, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 43 (2002).
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The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Grand Isle Shipyard v. Seacor Marine, LLC
(hereinafter Grand Isle III)7 is both substantial and extremely controversial,
much like the cavorting at the Grand Isle Tarpon Rodeo, Louisiana’s
notorious annual fishing rodeo.8 In Grand Isle III, the Fifth Circuit sought to
overhaul its existing case law and clarify the proper means to determine
whether a contract falls within the scope of OCSLA. By the end of it, the en
banc9 opinion penned by the Honorable Eugene Davis overruled a number of
decisions in the Fifth Circuit and established how the circuit, going forward,
would determine OCSLA situs in contract disputes.10 However, some feel that
the decision has done little to clear the muddy waters of Fifth Circuit case law,
and instead has exposed companies operating along the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS), under presumably calculated risks, to unsuspected liabilities.11
Determining whether federal maritime law or OCSLA applies to the
dispute is where the trouble begins.12 Grand Isle III established a test intended
to clear up when OCSLA would cause state law to become surrogate federal
law.13 Yet, recent district court decisions, like Armijo v. Tetra Technologies,14
have made it apparent that the water is still muddy. Armijo was appealed,
presenting a great opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to revisit Grand Isle III.15
7. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 543 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.
2008), reh’g en banc, Grand Isle Shipyard v. Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F.3d 778
(5th Cir. 2009), writ denied, Seacor Marine LLC v. Grand Isle Shipyard, 560 U.S.
952 (2010). This comment focuses primarily on the en banc decision, Grand Isle,
589 F.3d 778, commonly known as “Grand Isle III.”
8. See, e.g., Chris Ortte, Tarpon Rodeo Proves to be Wild West on Water,
THE DAILY REVEILLE (July 29, 2013), lsureveille.com/opinion/opinion-tarponrodeo-proves-to-be-wild-west-on-water/article_6c33e914-f8c1-11e2-b5a5001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/MA7L-LWKE].
9. When a circuit court sits “en banc,” this means the case was heard before
the entire circuit bench. En banc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
10. Grand Isle III overruled Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builder, 302 F.3d
531 (5th Cir. 2002); Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir.
2002); Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512 (5th Cir. 1996); Hollier v. Union
Texas Petroleum Corp., 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992); and Smith v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992).
11. Joseph G. Grasso & Elisabeth A. Pimentel, Interpretation and Enforcement
of Indemnity Provisions in Maritime Contracts: We Really Do Have To Ask, Is It Salty
Enough?, 24 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 375, 392–94 (2011-12).
12. Federal maritime law will validate such indemnity clauses, whereas OCSLA,
which applies state law as a “surrogate” federal law and generally nullifies indemnity
clauses. See, e.g., Baloney v. Ensco Offshore Co. 570 Fed. App’x. 423, 425 (5th Cir.
2014).
13. The “focus-of-the-contract” test determines whether or not the action arises
out of an OCSLA situs. It marked a shift from looking at where the claim provoking
the tort occurred, to where the work called for by the contract was to be performed.
The Comment will address this in further detail below.
14. 936 F. Supp.2d 675 (E.D. La. 2013), rev’d and rem’d, Tetra Technologies,
Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 2016 WL 730824, No. 15-30446 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2016).
15. Id. See discussion infra Part III(E).
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However, the Fifth Circuit ignored the chance and remanded Armijo,
instructing the district court to do precisely what it was unable to do initially,
given the circumstances.16
The irrefutable correlation between the oil patch and the maritime
industry makes the application of maritime jurisdiction to a contract vital.
Generally, the determination that maritime law—as opposed to state or other
substantive federal law—governs a contract has a significant bearing on the
legal consequences of the contract. For instance, maritime law prescribes its
own procedures, as well as other legalities such as the application of a
maritime lien.17 When it comes to oil and gas production, companies need a
reliable way to allocate risk. Contractual indemnity provisions between oil
companies and their contractors and subcontractors have become standard
practice.18 However, pendent upon applicable law, these indemnity provisions
are not always valid. For example, the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act
(LOIA) nullifies indemnification clauses contained in certain contracts
“pertaining to wells for oil, gas or water, or drilling for minerals.”19
This comment will address Grand Isle III’s misapplication of its endorsed
test to determine whether a contractual dispute arose on an OCSLA situs. Part
I will provide a background covering the basic origins of maritime law and
OCSLA, noting where litigation often arises between the two and how the
jurisprudence has developed. Part II will provide background of pivotal cases
pertaining to the matter. In Part III the comment will explore some of the
problems with the Circuit’s relevant test—the PLT test20—after Grand Isle
III. The final portion of Part III will analyze the recent Armijo and Tetra case,
which brought to fruition the problems created by Grand Isle III. Part IV will
proffer a solution to issues created by Grand Isle III.
16. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 2016 WL 730824, at *6 (rev’sing and rem’ding
Armijo); see discussion infra Part III(E).
17. See ALEX L. PARKS, THE LAW OF TUG, TOW, AND PILOTAGE 818–19 (2d
ed. 1982):
A true maritime lien may be defined as (a) a privileged claim, (b) upon
marine property, (c) for services rendered to it or damage caused by it,
(d) accruing from the moment when the claim attaches, (e) traveling with
the property unconditionally and (f) enforced by means of an action in
rem.
Significantly, maritime liens are completely different from the land-based lien,
“as virtually all of the rules relating to maritime liens are the exact opposite of the
rules relating to land-based liens.”
18. Adams & Milhollin, supra note 6, at 48 (2002) (“Risk allocation in the
offshore oil and gas industry is an omnipresent issue. The existence of indemnity
agreements has become commonplace in both maritime and oil and gas-related
contracts.”).
19. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (2016).
20. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. Texas Union Petroleum v. PLT
Engineering, 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 136 (1990)
[hereinafter PLT].

234

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

I. MARITIME OR OCSLA, SALT OR NO-SALT?
Due to expanding mineral exploration offshore, the federal
government recognized the need to assert uniform regulation over
territorial waters, which eventually led to the creation of OCSLA in
1953.21 Naturally, placing regulation over navigable waterways will
necessitate the consideration of maritime law, a much older body of law.
Because most oil and gas production occurs in the Gulf of Mexico, the
Fifth Circuit has been the pioneering court of OCSLA jurisprudence, often
as it relates to maritime jurisdiction.
A. Development of Maritime Contract Jurisdiction22
The laws of the sea are ancient, dating back to the times of Babylon
and the Code of Hammurabi.23 The first generally accepted system of
marine rules is typically attributed to the Rhodian Sea Law, though other
ancient nations likewise maintained maritime ordinances.24 Logically, the
body of law most important to American Admiralty and maritime law, at
its inception, was the English Admiralty.25 Being that it was the only
maritime law with which they were familiar, maritime lawyers in the
budding United States turned to English Admiralty.26 However, true to

21. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OCS Lands Act History (last visited
Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ [https://perma.cc
/DUH5-ZJJK]; Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1984).
22. In the United States, there is no practical difference between “admiralty”
and “maritime.” For the purposes of this paper, the two are used synonymously,
where admiralty and maritime jurisdiction both refer to “the exercise of authority
over maritime cases by the U.S. district courts sitting in admiralty.” Admiralty,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
23. 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY §§ 1-3 (7th ed. 2015).
24. The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 187–88 (1871). The Rhodian Sea Law is derived
from the Digest, a portion of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, largely attributed as
being the origins of the civil law. Rhodian Sea Law, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA,
http://www.britannica.com/event/Rhodian-Sea-Law [https://perma.cc/EXW5-F9F4]
(last visited on Sept. 19, 2016).
25. The general origin of English Admiralty is relatively uncertain. 1 BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY, § 104, p. 7-5 (7th ed. 2015). Ironically, English Admiralty drew from
the civil codes of Europe rather than common law jurisprudence. Id. Indeed a source
of great strife in England was the friction between the English Admiralty and the
English Common Law Courts. Id. at 31.
26. See, e.g., N.J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant’s Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344,
358 (1848) (“To what source, then, are we to go to ascertain what cases are committed
to the courts of the United States by the terms ‘cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction,’ used in the Constitution? . . . to the law of the parent country, England,
[] the country from whence this was settled, and from whence we derive, in general,
all our laws and institutions”).
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revolutionary form, early judicial sentiment of American admiralty echoed
the cries of a mutinous crew.27
In his unapologetically lengthy opinion in DeLovio v. Boit, Justice Story
initiated a break from English Admiralty.28 Justice Story, through cordial
subscription to methods of the “learned” Mr. Justice Winchester, made it
clear that American Admiralty jurisprudence, though of English descent will
not be prejudiced against maritime contracts simply because such contracts
were confected on land.29 Rather, he reasoned that maritime contract
jurisdiction “extends to all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or
executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations,) [sic] which
relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.”30 In New England
Mutual Marine Insurance Co. v. Dunham, Justice Bradley furthered the
principles established in DeLovio by introducing the language “nature and
subject matter” as the “true criterion” by which to determine a contract as
maritime or non-maritime.31 Since Dunham, courts have accepted the
applicability of maritime jurisdiction to a contract as a conceptual, rather
than a spatial determination—one that has proved consistent difficulty for
the courts.32
Admiralty subject matter jurisdiction has been statutorily granted to
federal district courts through 28 U.S.C. section 1333(1), which is grounded
in the Constitution’s recognition of admiralty jurisdiction as falling within
federal purview.33 As a result, there is an interplay between the legislature
and judiciary, whereby both have the ability to create admiralty and

27. Supra note 23, at 7-6 (“not be limited by the restraining statutes or the judicial
prohibitions of England—or by the local traditions of that land—but is to be
interpreted by an original view.”).
28. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (“I shall
make no apology for the length of this opinion.”).
29. Id. at 443.
30. As compared to maritime tort jurisdiction, which depends on the locality
of the tort committed. Id. at 444.
31. 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870).
32. Despite some two hundred years of precedent and an expressed grant of
jurisdiction, it is still apparent that “no grant of jurisdiction to the national courts has
been so difficult to define” than admiralty. THEODORE M. ETTING, THE ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION IN AMERICA, 2 (1879). Nearly a century after Mr. Etting mentioned the
difficulties of admiralty jurisdictional grant, the Supreme Court echoed the same
sentiment writing in Kossick v. United Fruit Co., “[t]he boundaries of admiralty
jurisdiction over contracts—as opposed to torts or crimes—being conceptual rather
than spatial, have always been difficult to draw.” 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961), reh’g
denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power to all admiralty
and maritime cases); see also, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (extending the legislative
power to admiralty and maritime cases, both specifically and in the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
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maritime law; Congress through statutory authority and the courts through
common law principles.34
The ad hoc nature of the common law has led admiralty contract
jurisdiction law to evolve in a way that has created many fact-intensive cases
where jurisdiction is granted. Generally, the particular types of contracts that
invoke admiralty jurisdiction are well settled.35 Some of these well-settled
instances of admiralty contracts include contracts to furnish stevedoring
services36 or vessel repairs.37 Whereas, marine insurance contracts, absent
controlling maritime law, are subject to state law.38 Additionally, contracts
to tow,39 pilot,40 or for wharfage41 of a vessel are in admiralty, as are
contracts for the carriage of passengers.42 Contracts to lease or charter

34. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, 2 (4th ed.
2004); see also, McBride v. Estis Well Serv., LLC, 731 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2013), on
reh’g en banc, 768 F.3d 382, 405 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015)
(“[T]here are two primary sources of federal maritime law: common law developed
by federal courts . . . and statutory law enacted by Congress.”).
35. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 34, at 60.
36. See, e.g., Am. Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); see also, Atl. &
Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Revell Shipping Agency, Inc., 750 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1985).
Stevedore means “to work at or undertake responsibility for the loading or unloading
of (a ship).” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2239 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Diesel “Repower,” Inc. v. Islander Investments Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318
(11th Cir. 2001). In contrast, a contract to repair a “dead” ship does not fall within
admiralty. See, Colonna’s Shipyard, Inc. v. U.S.A.F. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 584
F. Supp.2d 862, 867 (E.D. Va. 2008) (stating that a contract to repair a “dead” ship
does not fall within admiralty).
38. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1995).
39. See, e.g., Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
40. See, e.g., Jackson v. Marine Exploration Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 65 (5th Cir.
1980); N.J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant’s Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344 (1848); Ex
parte McNiel, 80 U.S. 236 (1872); Fordham v. Munson S.S. Line, 6 F. Supp. 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1933).
41. See, e.g., Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 68, 77 (1877). Wharfage is
defined as “1a: the provision or the use of a wharf. b: the handling or stowing of goods
on a wharf. 2a: the charge for the use of a wharf for freight handling or ship dockage.
b: a charge assessed for handling incoming or outgoing cargo on a wharf. 3: the wharf
accommodations of a place.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2599-600 (1976). The unloading or loading of cargo is considered within admiralty.
See Marubeni-Iida (America), Inc. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 207 F. Supp. 418, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), citing to, Am. Stevedores, 330 U.S. at 456. However, “[i]t is clear
that admiralty has no jurisdiction over an action for damage to cargo being held for
storage purposes.” Id. citing to, Pillsbury Flour Mill Co. v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d
439 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 845 (1930).
42. See, e.g., Lubick v. Travel Services, Inc. 573 F. Supp. 904 (D.V.I. 1983).
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vessels are in admiralty,43 but contracts to sell or construct entirely new
vessels are not.44 Even contracts to cater or supply groceries to a movable
drilling rig are in admiralty.45
Nevertheless, discerning whether a contract for work to be performed
offshore or over the OCS falls within admiralty, has proven to be a most
trying task. While a contract may place parties directly above water, in the
Gulf of Mexico it is never safe to assume maritime law will inevitably apply
to a dispute. Thus, off the Fifth Circuit coast, companies run the risk of
facing OCSLA and losing protections afforded to them by maritime law.
B. Origins of OCSLA
Congress enacted OCSLA to assert federal control over the natural
resources located on the OCS and to encourage oil and gas exploration.46
Enacted on August 7, 1953, the Act defines the OCS as encompassing “all
submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath
navigable waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the
United States.”47 Furthermore, for the application of certain sections of
OCSLA—such as 43 U.S.C. sections 1333(a)(2) and 1333(b)—the situs

43. See, e.g., Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, 575 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2009);
Armour & Co. v. F. Morgan S. S. Co., 270 U.S. 253 (1926); Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug
Peggy, 428 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970); Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.
1980); see also, Sword Line, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1956), aff’d,
351 U.S. 976 (1956) (describing a quasi-contract action for the alleged overpayment
of a charter for government merchant vessels; holding the case in admiralty).
Preliminary agreements to charter a vessel do not fall within admiralty. See, e.g.,
Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping) Co., 739 F.2d 798, 801 (2d
Cir. 1984), writ denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985), citing to, The Thames, 10 F. 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1881).
44. See, e.g., People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1858).
However, the general rule has become that a vessel under construction may become
the object of a contract when construction has progressed enough so that the vessel
may perform its intended use. Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254
U.S. 242 (1920).
45. Stoot v. Fluor Drilling Services, Inc., 851 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
47. See 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2012).
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requirement established by 43 U.S.C. section 1333(a)(1) must be met.48 The
Act was broadly interpreted in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. to
include as an OCSLA situs fixed structures such as artificial island drilling
rigs located on the Outer Continental Shelf.49 However, in Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, the Supreme Court restricted the application of
OCSLA to accidents “actually occurring” on an artificial island.50
Additionally, although federal law exclusively governs the OCS, section
1333(a)(2) provides for the laws of the adjacent state to apply as the
“surrogate federal law.”51 Unless state law conflicts with federal law,
whether state law applies as surrogate federal law has been the center point
of a great deal of complex OCSLA litigation; particularly, in litigation over
jurisdiction and choice-of-law.52
C. Litigating OCSLA in the Fifth Circuit
Of course, the Fifth Circuit is where these choice-of-law cases will
moor, as nearly all OCSLA-related cases involve disputes that arise out of

48. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1):
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United
States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf
and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices
permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected
thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or
vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources, to the same extent as
if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer
Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of
this subchapter.
(emphasis in original).
49. 395 U.S. 352, 355–58 (1969).
50. 477 U.S. 207, 217 (1986). The case involved a wrongful death action arising
out of a helicopter crash into the high sea. The Court applied the Death on the High
Seas Act, reasoning that “[a]lthough the decedents were killed while riding in a
helicopter and not a more traditional maritime conveyance, that helicopter was
engaged in a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels: the ferrying of
passengers from an ‘island,’ albeit an artificial one, to the shore.” Id. 477 U.S. at 218.
51. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 357 (1969). At this
time, the Supreme Court was interpreting an earlier version of OCSLA, as the Act
was amended in 1978.
52. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 34, at 51.
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the Gulf of Mexico.53 Although not the earliest case of this type, Demette v.
Falcon Drilling Company54 delineated important situs distinctions within
section 1333(a)(1), providing an analytical launch-point. In Demette, which
centered on an indemnity claim, the Fifth Circuit found the contractual
dispute arose on an OCSLA situs purely because the relevant accident
occurred on an OCSLA situs.55 The court incorporated distinct locations that
satisfy the OCSLA situs test as prescribed in section 1333(a)(1):
The OCSLA applies to all of the following locations:
(1) the subsoil and seabed of the OCS;
(2) any artificial island, installation, or other device if:
(a) it is permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed of
the OCS, and
(b) it has been erected on the seabed of the OCS, and
(c) its presence on the OCS is to explore for, develop, or
produce resources from the OCS;
(3) any artificial island, installation, or other device if:
(a) it is permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed of
the OCS, and
(b) it is not a ship or vessel, and
(c) its presence on the OCS is to transport resources from the
OCS.56
Subsequently, Demette was overruled on the grounds that it improperly
attributed OCSLA situs to the facts based on tort, rather than contract,
principles.57 Nonetheless, the situs distinctions furthered by Demette are still
important for situs determinations, regardless of whether a court is inquiring
about a tort or contractual dispute.58
53. Prior to 1981, the Fifth Circuit encompassed all Gulf Coast states. However,
it was split into two different appellate circuits: the current Fifth Circuit (Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi) and the current Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Georgia, and
Florida). Thomas J. Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the
Rights to Privacy and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 92 (1986). Still, because most oil and gas production in the
Gulf of Mexico stems from Texas and Louisiana, today’s Fifth Circuit handles just
about every OCSLA case.
54. 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002), reh’g denied, 37 Fed. Appx. 93 (2002),
overruled on other grounds, Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 786.
55. Id. at 498.
56. Id. at 497.
57. Id. at 492, reh’g denied, 37 Fed. Appx. 93 (2002), overruled on other
grounds, Grand Isle, 589 F.3d at 786.
58. See, e.g., Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir.
2013); McDowell v. C&D Prod. Specialists, Co., Inc., No. 14-569, 2015 WL
4564771, at *3 (W.D. La. 2015); and Energy XXI, GoM, LLC v. New Tech Eng’g,
L.P., 787 F. Supp.2d 590, 601 (S.D. Tx. 2011).
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Rodrigue dealt with consolidated wrongful death actions: one arising
out of an accident involving a crane mounted to the artificial island drilling
rig59 and the other resulting from a fall atop the derrick above the artificial
island drilling rig.60 In Rodrigue, the Fifth Circuit explained that once the
OCSLA situs has been satisfied, it must next be determined whether state
law applies as “surrogate” federal law under 43 U.S.C. section
1333(a)(2).61 In making this determination, the Fifth Circuit employs a test
adopted in 1990, which serves as the courts’ “analytical starting point.”62
In Texas Union Petroleum v. PLT Engineering (hereinafter PLT),63 the
Fifth Circuit articulated the three-prong “PLT test,” allegedly formulated
in Rodrigue,64 to determine this inquiry:
[For state law to govern:] (1) The controversy must arise on a situs
covered by OCSLA (i.e., the subsoil, seabed, or artificial structure
permanently or temporarily attached thereto); (2) Federal maritime
law must not apply of its own force; and (3) the state law must not be
inconsistent with Federal law.65
Often, inquiry into the test’s second prong—whether federal maritime law
applies of its own force—dictates the result.66 In Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp. (hereinafter Davis), the Fifth Circuit prescribed a rather
59. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 352 (1969).
60. Id. at 354.
61. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 34, at 51. See § 1333(a)(2) reading:
(a) Constitution and United States laws; laws of adjacent States;
publication of projected State lines; international boundary disputes;
restriction on State taxation and jurisdiction: (2)(A) To the extent that
they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with
other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or
hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now
in effect or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are declared to be
the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its
boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer
Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the
Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining
each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and
enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State
taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf. (B) Within
one year after September 18, 1978, the President shall establish
procedures for setting any outstanding international boundary dispute
respecting the outer Continental Shelf.
62. Robertson, supra note 1, at 541.
63. 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 136 (1990).
64. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 1047.
66. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 34, at 53.
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particular test for determining the second prong—whether a contract for
offshore drilling activity constitutes a maritime contract:
1) What does the specific work order in effect at the time of the
injury provide?
2) What work did the crew assigned under the work order actually
do?
3) Was the crew assigned to do work aboard a vessel in navigable
waters?
4) To what extent did the work being done relate to the mission of
the vessel?
5) What was the principal work of the injured worker? and
6) What work was the injured worker actually doing at the time of
the injury?67
These cases form the framework for the Fifth Circuit’s adjudication of
OCSLA choice-of-law disputes.68 Further, as nearly all OCSLA cases are
decided in the Fifth Circuit, other circuits often follow the Fifth Circuit’s
methods in their intermittent adjudication of OCSLA disputes.69
II. PIVOTAL CASES
The crux of Fifth Circuit jurisprudence on OCSLA choice-of-law
analysis relies on two cases, separated by nearly twenty-years of litigation:
PLT and Grand Isle III.

67. 919 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1990), reh’g denied, 924 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.
1991).
68. See, e.g., ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. M-I, LLC, 699 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2012) and
Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 936 F. Supp.2d 675 (E.D. La. 2013), appeal
docketed, Tetra Technologies, Inc., et. al. v. Vertex Services, LLC, No. 12-2667, 2015
WL 1810453 (E.D. La. April 20, 2015).
69. See, e.g., Valladolid v. Pacific Operations, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“[W]e adopt the following test . . . [which] is consistent with the pre-Mills
Fifth Circuit interpretation of [43 U.S.C.] § 1333(b), which we endorse.”); and Curtis
v. Schlumberger Offshore Serv., Inc., 849 F.2d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We agree
with the Fifth Circuit position that the ‘but for’ test is appropriate in establishing
whether Curtis’s injury occurred as a result of operations on the outer continental
shelf.”).
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A. PLT: Grey Horses and Ubiquitous Tentacles70
For twenty-five years, PLT has formed the backbone of the Fifth Circuit’s
choice-of-law analysis under OCSLA.71 However, unlike the majority of
these contractual indemnity cases, PLT was not an indemnity clause case, nor
did it arise from the commission of a tort.72 Instead, PLT was, as the court put
it in Grand Isle III, a “pure contract case.”73 The dispute arose from Union
Texas Petroleum’s (UTP) invocation of a contractual provision that allowed
the corporation to withhold payment to PLT in the event PLT failed to pay its
subcontractors.74 PLT sued to obtain payment for its work, and further sought
to impose a statutory lien on the pipeline.75 Whether PLT was entitled to the
lien depended on whether Louisiana law applied as surrogate federal law
under OCSLA.76 According to the contract, PLT was obligated to “design,
fabricate, and install a gas transportation system from a platform owned by
UTP . . . to a side tap” in a different pipeline, all located on or buried under
the OCS.77 The Fifth Circuit instituted the three-pronged PLT test that guides
district courts’ determination of whether state law should act as surrogate to
federal law under section 1333(a)(2)(A).78

70. Title inspired by the language in Circuit Judge Brown’s opinion; see, PLT,
895 F.2d at 1049.
71. The following cases either examined or discussed PLT when analyzing a
dispute relating to the OCS: Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009); Demette,
280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002); Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512 (5th Cir.
1996); Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2013); ACE Am. Ins.,
699 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2012); Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde
Engineered Products Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006); Diamond Offshore Co.
v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2002); Dahlen v. Gulf Crews, Inc., 281
F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 2014);
Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Deepwater
Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014) (declined to extend); Baloney v. Ensco
Offshore Co., 570 Fed. Appx. 423 (5th Cir. 2014); Cutting Underwater Technologies
USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2012); Hamm v. Island
Operating Co., 450 Fed. Appx. 365 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pickett, 598 F.3d
231 (5th Cir. 2010); Alleman v. Omni Energy Services Corp., 580 F.3d 280 (5th Cir.
2009); Stanfield v. Island Operating Co., 306 Fed. Appx. 175 (5th Cir. 2009).
72. PLT, 895 F.2d 1043, 1046.
73. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 785.
74. PLT, 895 F.2d at 1046.
75. Id. at 1045–46.
76. Id. at 1049–50.
77. Id. at 1045.
78. Id. at 1047.
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Courts in the Fifth Circuit have since followed the PLT test without
hesitation.79 Most peculiar is the fact that, in Grand Isle III, the court
claimed the PLT test was a three-step process originally formulated by the
Supreme Court in Rodrigue; however, it would be a fruitless endeavor to
search for anything formulating these three conditions in Rodrigue.80
Moreover, the PLT test itself has not been a cornerstone of clarity.
Arguably, the test is flawed.81 As Professor David Robertson, a leading
admiralty scholar, has averred (prior to Grand Isle III), the PLT test
contains three flaws:
(a) PLT’s first element affirmatively misrepresents [43 USC section]
1333(a)(2)(A) by putting “temporarily attached” structures within its
coverage. (b) PLT’s second element elides the fact that [section]
1333(a)(2)(A) precludes the application of adjacent-state federal law
only when it is “inconsistent with . . . other Federal laws.” Federal
maritime law and adjacent-state surrogate federal law might both
apply in a case in which there is no inconsistency between the two.
(c) PLT’s third element overlaps its second in a confusingly
inaccurate way, implying on the one hand that federal maritime law
may not have to be inconsistent with adjacent-state law in order to
oust it and on the other hand that federal maritime law may not
constitute “other Federal laws” for [section] 1333(a)(2)(A)
purposes.82
Furthermore, after Grand Isle III, whether the PLT test’s three-step
process actually continues to serve its function is up for debate.83 Granted,
these flaws may have been real issues with the PLT test before Grand Isle
III. However, because the Fifth Circuit made such a substantial shift in the
PLT test’s application, additional issues have since developed.

79. See, e.g., The PLT test “is firmly supported in the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence
as the proper test for deciding whether state law provides the rule of decision in an
OCSLA case.” Grand Isle I, 2007 WL 2874808, at *3 (citing Hodgen v. Forest Oil
Corp., 87 F.3d 1512, 1526 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also, Baloney v. Ensco Offshore Co.,
570 Fed. Appx. 423, 425–26 (5th Cir. 2014), applying the PLT test; and In re
Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 n.10 (5th Cir. 2014).
80. Reiterating Professor Robertson’s sentiment; see, David W. Robertson, OCS
Indemnity Contracts: State Law or Maritime Law?—Grand Isle Shipyard v. Seacor
Marine, LLC, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 467, 490 (2011), citing to, Hogden, 87 F.3d at 1525
(“The PLT test was first announced in that case in 1990 without relevant citation.”).
81. Robertson, supra note 1, at 541.
82. Id.
83. See Robertson, supra note 80, at 490.
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B. Grand Isle III: The Salt less Rodeo
Grand Isle III involved a dispute over a contractual indemnity clause
triggered by the injury of Grand Isle Shipyard (GIS) employee, Denny
Neil, on a Seacor Marine vessel.84 While en route to the residential
platform after a day’s work, Neil tripped trying to exit the galley of the
M/V SEA HORSE IV, injuring his ankle.85 He initially sued Seacor, which
subsequently settled, but in turn sued GIS for indemnity pursuant to its
contracts with BP American Production Company (BP).86 Seacor and GIS
had contracted respectively with BP to service BP’s platforms on the
OCS.87 The contractual relationship between GIS and BP consisted of two
levels: first, under a blanket agreement, the Master Maintenance and
Construction Services Contract (MMCSC), and second, within specific
work orders.88
Seacor and BP contracted by way of a Vessel Charter Agreement,
which called for the transportation of laborers to and from the various
platforms.89 Although these contracts with BP were separate and distinct,
it was understood that they created a relationship between all three
parties.90 Each contract contained an identical hold-harmless indemnity
clause that stipulated all contractors and subcontractors of BP were to
indemnify each other in the event liabilities were incurred.91 As in PLT,
84. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 781.
86. Id. at 782.
87. Id. at 789.
88. Master Service agreements lay out the general provisions of a contractual
relationship, whereas a “work order” is more like an invoice that shows what specific
work has been performed. Neil’s work order on the day of the accident called for
laying and welding down grating, welding a pollution rail, and clean up the work
space. See Motion for Summary Judgment by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., Gray Ins.
Co., Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009)
(No. 06-01405) (Exhibit “D-Part 5” Daily Work Tickets).
89. See id. (Exhibit “C-Part 1” Vessel Charter Contract).
90. See the contractual language provided at Grand Isle, 589 F.3d at 791:
Contractor [Grand Isle] agrees to defend, indemnify, release and hold
company’s [BP] to other contractors [e.g., Seacor] harmless in accordance
with the provisions of this Article 14 (to the extent such other Contractors
execute cross indemnification provisions substantially similar to those
contained in this section 14.07) from and against all claims, liabilities,
damages, and expenses (including without limitation attorney’s fees and
other costs of defense), irrespective of insurance coverage for the
following: (i) all injuries to, deaths, or illnesses or persons in contracted
group CG . . . .
91. This is common practice in the industry; however, there are strong policy
reasons to nullify these kinds of indemnity clauses—they too often are the result of
unequal bargaining power. Some states (e.g., Louisiana (LOIA) and Texas (Texas
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute)) have enacted legislation to nullify these clauses.
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the validity of the indemnity clauses depended on “whether the adjacent
state law of Louisiana, including LOIA [Louisiana Oilfield AntiIndemnity Act], applies to the case.”92 If Louisiana law applied, the
indemnity clauses would be nullified, but if Louisiana law did not apply,
the clauses would be valid and enforceable.93
The court focused its analysis on the first PLT prong (whether the
controversy arose on a situs covered by OCSLA),94 ultimately establishing
the “focus-of-the-contract” test as the means for determining the first PLT
prong. The court deferred to the district court on the second and third
prongs.95 This became an opportunity for the court to correct a disparity in
its jurisprudence. Specifically, before Grand Isle III, the Fifth Circuit had
not analyzed the first PLT prong consistently; some panels had looked to
where the tort occurred, while others looked to the nature of the contract.96
Reasoning that it was improper to apply tort law principles while
adjudicating contract law disputes, Grand Isle III settled the intra-circuit
split and overruled a number of cases.97 Accordingly, the majority assessed
the first prong under the “focus-of-the-contract.”98 Specifically, the test
examines where a majority of work called for by the contract is
performed.99 The court held that “a contractual indemnity claim (or any
other contractual dispute) arises on an OCSLA situs if a majority of the
performance called for under the contract is to be performed on stationary
platforms or other OCSLA situses enumerated in 43 U.S.C. section
1333(a)(2)(A).”100

92. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 782.
93. See id. at 782.
94. See id. at 783; Robertson, supra note 80, at 471 (“Once Grand Isle had
won the ‘OCSLA situs’ battle, the war was pretty much over.”).
95. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 789 (5th Cir. 2009).
96. Id. at 786.
97. See cases cited supra note 10.
98. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 787. A significant reason why courts urge the
distinction between tort and contract jurisdiction is because of the “fortuity element”
involved in torts. A fortuitous event is defined as “[a] happening that, because it occurs
only by chance or accident, the parties could not reasonably have foreseen.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 769 (10th ed. 2014). See also, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1875 (“A
fortuitous event is one that, at the time the contract was made, could not have been
reasonably foreseen.”). Tort actions are governed by the laws of the place where the
tort occurred; see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
Because the jurisdiction where (at least negligent) torts occur is largely left up to
chance, the governing law is equally fortuitous. Where a contract seeks to
predetermine which laws will govern a relationship in the event of a dispute between
the parties, it would be counterintuitive to subject a contracted relationship to chance.
99. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 787.
100. See id.

246

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

III. THE PROBLEMS WITH PLT AFTER GRAND ISLE III
There are a number of problems with Grand Isle III and, since the
opinion was released in 2009, many of these concerns have been voiced,
but deserve to be revisited.
A. What is Left of the First and Second Prongs
After Grand Isle III, the PLT test can scarcely be said to still serve its
purpose. By holding that the first prong’s focus is aimed at where the
contract calls for the work to be performed, Grand Isle III effectively
merged the first and second prongs.101 Deciding the first prong under a
focus of the contract test essentially “dismantles” the test.102 Professor
Robertson called this a “strong move toward making the nature of the
contract . . . dominant for the first PLT factor as well.”103 However, calling
it a “strong move toward” underestimates the result—the move precisely
made the nature of the contract the dominant consideration of the first PLT
factor. Illustrating the result of this shift, the second prong seeks to
determine the “nature and character” of the contract.104 Perhaps the most
indicative element of a contract’s nature and character is where a majority
of the work is to be performed. Judge Garza warned of this overlap in his
dissent to Grand Isle III.105 Even so, the fusion of the first and second
prongs, though unintentional, should theoretically provide for a more
efficient test—allowing courts to analyze the issue communally.106
B. Grand Isle III’s Chance to Get Salty: Kirby and Davis
It is a mystery as to why the court limited its analysis of the second
and third prong to judicial check swings, afforded only brief mentioning

101. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 799 (5th Cir. 2009).
102. See Robertson, supra note 80, at 490.
103. Id.
104. As the second prong of its analysis, the PLT test employs the test furthered
by Davis. Grand Isle I, the district court decision, examined the second prong in full
Davis analysis and concluded Neil’s work order and GIS’ MMCSC did not constitute
a maritime contract. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, No. 06-1405,
2007 WL 2874808, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2007). Ultimately, the goal of Davis is
to determine whether a contract’s “nature and character” constitutes a maritime
contract. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1990),
reh’g denied, 924 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1991).
105. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 799–800.
106. See infra text Part IV.
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in the majority’s opinion.107 Notwithstanding Judge Engelhardt’s
agreeable analysis of the contract under Davis,108 the Fifth Circuit skirted
an opportunity to bring its maritime contract test up to date. The Supreme
Court addressed maritime contract jurisdiction determination in Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby five years prior to Grand Isle III and
fourteen years after Davis.109
1. The Supreme Court’s Modification of Maritime Contract
Jurisdiction in Kirby
The issue presented in Kirby was whether bills of lading110 for the
shipment of goods that required both rail and vessel transportation should
be considered maritime contracts.111 The dispute arose out of a train
derailment between Savannah, Georgia and Huntsville, Alabama.112 The
bills of lading governing the parties called for the transportation of goods
from Sydney, Australia, to Huntsville, Alabama; requiring the goods to be
transferred from ship to rail at Savanna, Georgia, in order to reach the final
destination.113 Critically, each bill of lading contained a “Himalaya
Clause,” which is intended to limit liabilities of parties in a shipping
arrangement.114 The Himalaya Clause is generally accepted in
international shipping nations, but its “effect varies from total exculpation
in some countries to invalidity in others.”115 Himalaya Clauses have not

107. Only at the second to last paragraph of the majority’s opinion are the second
and third PLT prongs sparingly addressed. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 789 (5th
Cir. 2009).
108. See, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, No. 06-1405, 2007
WL 2874808, at *4–5 (E.D. La. 2007).
109. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004).
110. A bill of lading is a detailed list of shipment of goods in the form of a receipt
given by the carrier to the person consigning the goods. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY THIRD EDITION (2010). Bills of lading serve as prima facie evidence of
the goods shipped. 46 U.S.C. § 30703(c). Additionally, a bill of lading can be both a
contract and a receipt; see J.K. Armsby Co. v. Actieselskabet Dampskibet Island, 272
F. 266 (2d Cir. 1921), cert denied, 257 U.S. 634 (1921).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 19.
113. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 18.
114. Himalaya Clauses are contractual devices that provide liability limitations to
other downstream parties that take part in the contract’s execution. They originate
from the English case, Adler v. Dickson, [1955] 1 Q.B. 158 (C.A.).
115. Joseph C. Sweeney, Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global
Transport. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, PTY LTD., 125 S. Ct.
385, 2004 AMC 2705 (2004), 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 155, 162 (April, 2005).
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received seamless acceptance in the U.S. federal courts,116 just as
indemnity clauses are not deemed valid in all U.S. state jurisdictions.117
Initially, the parties in Kirby assumed that federal law, as opposed to state
law, applied.118 It was not until the case reached the Supreme Court that
counsel for Kirby argued the matter sounded in tort—calling for the
application of state law and the subsequent nullification of the Himalaya
Clause.119 As in Grand Isle III, in Kirby, determining the controlling law of
the bills of lading—federal maritime or state—ultimately determined the
applicability of the bills’ Himalaya Clauses.120 If maritime law applied, the
Himalaya Clauses were enforceable, affording Norfolk Southern liability
protection. Conversely, if state law applied, the clauses would be nullified.
The Court ultimately ruled that maritime law would apply to the bills of
lading, reasoning that, “[c]onceptually, so long as the bill of lading requires
substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime
commerce—and thus is a maritime contract.”121
Prior to Kirby, when courts were presented with disputes arising from
mixed contracts, the standard was to separate the parts of the contract when
possible and to apply the appropriate law to each part, respectively.122 This
was known as the mixed contract doctrine. Arguably, Kirby did away with the
mixed contract doctrine, which resulted in an expansion of the bounds of
admiralty contract jurisdiction.123 Relative to Grand Isle III, and all other Fifth
Circuit cases after Kirby, Kirby proves important because of the effect it
should have on the second PLT prong. Considering the Supreme Court’s new
maritime contract jurisdiction regime, there is propensity for some of these
Fifth Circuit OCSLA contract disputes to have been within federal maritime
jurisdiction.

116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2780 (2016).
118. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22 (2004).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 31–32.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Generally, mixed contracts did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction.
However, a court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a contract with obligations
for carriage over both land and sea if: (1) the claim arises from a breach of maritime
obligations that are severable from the non-maritime portion obligations, or (2) the
land-based portion of the contract was merely incidental. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Orient Overseas Containers (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir. 2000).
123. Marva Jo Wyatt, COGSA Comes Ashore . . . and more: The Supreme Court
Makes Inroads Promoting Uniformity and Maritime Commerce in Norfolk Southern
Railway v. Kirby, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 101, 122 (2006).
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2. Davis: The Fifth Circuit’s Maritime Contract Jurisdiction Test
The Fifth Circuit’s maritime contract jurisdiction test was set forth in
Davis.124 However, determining whether Fifth Circuit verdicts of the past
decade in OCSLA disputes under Davis would have been different is not
entirely necessary to prove that Davis is “obsolete.”125 Evidencing its age,
Davis recognized the mixed contract doctrine.126 Kirby has at least
diminished, if not demolished, the mixed contract doctrine.127 Aside from the
issues with PLT, just by the mere pecking order of the judiciary system, the
Fifth Circuit should have incorporated Kirby into the second prong of the PLT
test. The Fifth Circuit has since recognized Kirby on occasion, but has largely
remained idle at the chance to even revisit Davis in lieu of Kirby, much less
implement Kirby into the second PLT factor.128
However, to say that Davis is entirely obsolete is a stretch. There are
certainly some elements in Davis that are not inconsistent with Kirby and
would tend to aid in the determination of the nature and character of the
contract. A particularly important element furthered by Davis concerns
contractual arrangements consisting of two parts, a blanket agreement
followed by later work orders.129 Davis held that in these circumstances, the
court should interpret the two together.130 In fact, some of Davis’s language
anticipated Kirby:

124. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
125. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 542. Given the age of Davis (twenty-six
years), the argument that it has become “obsolete” appears to have some merit,
especially since Kirby has since been decided.
126. See Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 315–16 (5th Cir.
1990), citing to, Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Bonnasse, 19 F.2d
777, 779 (2d Cir. 1927), quoted in Hale v. Co-Mar Offshore Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1212,
1217 (W.D. La. 1984).
127. See Wyatt, supra note 123; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & JESSICA L.
MCCLELLAN, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 1-10 (4th ed., 2010 Pocket Part).
128. Davis is still considered to be good law by Fifth Circuit standards and is
consistently applied. See Baloney v. ENSCO, Inc., No. 11-2730, 2013 WL 1856039
(5th Cir. 2013), aff’d, Baloney v. Ensco Offshore Co., 570 Fed. Appx. 423 (5th Cir.
2014); ACE Am. Ins. v. M-I, LLC, 699 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2012); Devon La. Corp. v.
Petra Consultants, Inc., 247 Fed. Appx. 539 (5th Cir. 2007); Hoda v. Rowan Co., 419
F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). Additionally, research to date does not provide any
substantive negative treatment of Davis & Sons. Raffray v. Gulf Logistics, LLC, No.
10-1017, 2010 WL 5055849 (E.D. La. 2010) declined to extend Davis. In Alleman v.
Omni Energy Services Corp., 580 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2009), the sitting panel
comprised of Circuit Judges Smith, Garza, and Clement, quoted Kirby but continued
on stating, “In this circuit, we utilize the two-part inquiry laid out in Davis” without
acknowledging the disparities between the two and Davis’s apparent age.
129. Davis, 919 F.2d at 315.
130. Id. However, Grand Isle III seems to have rejected this; see infra note 138.
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Whether the blanket agreement and works, read together, do or do
not constitute a maritime contract depends . . . on the ‘nature and
character of the contract,’ rather than on its place of execution or
performance . . . a contract is maritime if it has a ‘genuinely salty
flavor.’131
Moreover, the six factors advanced in Davis to determine maritime contract
jurisdiction, when the historical treatment is not readily apparent, are not
inconsistent with the goals of Kirby and may still help courts evaluate the
nature and character of the contract.132 That being said, these factors serve best
as complimenting elements for determining a contract’s primary objective,
rather than being the steadfast rule.
Prior to Grand Isle III, courts within the Fifth Circuit have
acknowledged the relation between Davis and Kirby.133 Specifically, the
district courts were of the opinion that “[Kirby] did not alter this circuit’s
standards for determining whether a contract is maritime or nonmaritime.”134 Notwithstanding the numerous opportunities, the Fifth
Circuit has not explicitly addressed the apparent discrepancy, but instead
continues with Davis.135
C. Application of the “Focus-of-the-Contract” Test
Despite establishing the focus-of-the-contract test, Grand Isle III did
not offer guidance on how to apply the test.136 It is easy to point out the
difficulty in determining what constitutes the “majority” of the work called
for by the contract purely by the imprecise nature of “majority.”137
However, Grand Isle III’s application of the test to the circumstances is

131. Davis, 919 F.2d at 316, citing to, N. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry.
& Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 125 (1919); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S.
731 (1961) (emphasis added). Kirby echoed the language of Davis, using “nature and
character” and “place of the contract’s formation or performance.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 24 (2004).
132. When the historical treatment in jurisprudence does not easily reveal a
contract to be maritime, Davis lists six fact-specific factors to determine how the
contract should be treated. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 316
(5th Cir. 1990). See supra note 67 and accompanying text for factors.
133. See Alleman, 580 F.3d at 284.
134. See, e.g., Alleman v. Omni Energy Services Corp., 434 F. Supp.2d 405, 411
(E.D. La. 2006).
135. See supra note 128.
136. See Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 801 (5th Cir. 2009) (Garza, J., dissenting).
137. To refresh, in applying the focus-of-the-contract test, a contractual dispute
will arise “under an OCSLA situs if a majority of the work called for by the contract
is on stationary platforms or other enumerated OCSLA situses.” Grand Isle III, 589
F.3d at 787 (italics added).
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not so obvious. There are two clear issues with the majority’s application
of the focus-of-the-contract test.
First, it appears the majority applied the test to the work order under
which Neil was operating, instead of together with the blanket agreement. 138
It is common practice in the industry to form contractual relationships at two
levels; first, sign a blanket agreement, and then later issue work orders for
specific jobs.139 This begs the question of which to apply the focus-of-thecontract test to: the blanket agreement, the work order, or both. Prior to Grand
Isle III, it was well established that courts were to interpret blanket agreements
and work orders together.140 In footnote six of Grand Isle III, the majority
acknowledged the Circuit’s prior interpretive method, reading both the
blanket contract and work order together. However, without expressly
rejecting the prior analytical framework, the court appeared to endorse a
narrower inquiry into the work order only.141
Second, the majority incorrectly examined only the contract between GIS
and BP to determine the focus of the contract. As courts are to interpret the
blanket agreement and work order together, courts should look to the entire
contractual network where multiple contractors are servicing a common party
to achieve one end-goal. Furthermore, in these unique circumstances where a
common party contracts with multiple parties and requires each to hold
harmless the other, looking to the common party’s purpose would reveal the
true overall focus of the contracts.
If the court insists on applying a focus-of-the-contract test, at the very
least it cannot be proper to look only at a specific work order—this will not
138. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 787, n.6 (citing footnote six of the majority’s
opinion, which is not entirely clear as to whether the majority has endorsed
interpretation of the blanket contract and work order together or pursuant only to the
work order):
As we discussed in Davis & Sons v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313, 315–17
(5th Cir.1990), reh’g denied, 924 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.1991), it is a common
practice for companies contracting for work in the oilfield to enter into
contracts in two stages. Typically, they first sign a ‘blanket contract’ that
may remain in place for an extended period of time. Later, they issue work
orders for the performance of specific work, which usually incorporates the
terms of the blanket contract. As we said in [Davis], where the contract
consists of two parts, a blanket ‘contract followed by later work order, the
two must be interpreted together.’
Generally, each work order is for a discrete, relatively short-term job. Unless
a contrary intent is reflected by the master contract and the work order, in
determining situs in a contract case such as this, courts should ordinarily
look to the location where the work is to be performed pursuant to the
specific work order rather than the long term blanket contract. (italics
added).
139. See Davis, 919 F.2d at 315–17.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 138.
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account for the focus-of-the contract, or in some instances, may even fail to
provide enough evidence to award a judgment.142 Clearly, parties operating
under such contractual arrangements involving several parties are not
operating solely under the work order, or solely pursuant to the blanket
agreement. The contractual network creates a broad relationship that
encompasses all contractors and subcontractors.143 This misapplication of the
adopted focus-of-the-contract test led to Grand Isle III’s most inequitable
result—the abrogation of all reciprocity between Seacor and GIS, a result that
will follow in future contractual relationships of the same structure.
D. The (not so) Reciprocal Indemnity of Grand Isle III
Section 905(b) of the Longshore Harbor and Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA)144 invalidates indemnity agreements from covered maritime
employers to vessel owners, 145 whereas section 905(c) creates an exception
to the rule. Pursuant to section 905(c), if the injured party is entitled to benefits
under LHWCA “by virtue of section 1333 of Title 43” (OCSLA), then

142. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 148, 151 and accompanying text.
144. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) reads: Negligence of vessel
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel
as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title,
and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly
or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.
If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence
of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such
person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking
services and such person’s employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice,
agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted,
in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person’s
employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel’s owner, owner pro hac
vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer.
The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the
warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred.
The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other
remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
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“reciprocal indemnity provisions” between covered maritime employer and
vessel are valid.146
Before Grand Isle III, it was noted that, although section 905(c) required
reciprocity between vessels and covered maritime employers, the Fifth Circuit
did not require contractual “privity” between the parties.147 So long as a
reciprocal agreement existed between the contractor and vessel owner or
operator, indemnity extended to other non-signatory contractors.148
Additionally, it was not required that the reciprocal agreement be identical.149
Recognizing these principles, it should apply a fortiori150 to Grand Isle III that
the parties were entitled to indemnity. The contracts at issue in Grand Isle III
contained “virtually identical” reciprocal indemnity clauses and the parties,
GIS and Seacor, were not merely other contractors, but signatories.151
Nevertheless, Grand Isle III’s outcome proved far from reciprocal, but
virtually one-sided.152
As it was, there was no doubt that the Vessel Charter between Seacor and
BP would have been considered a maritime contract.153 Accordingly, the
indemnity clause contained in the Vessel Charter would have been
146. 33 U.S.C. § 905(c) reads: Outer Continental Shelf
In the event that the negligence of a vessel causes injury to a person entitled
to receive benefits under this Act by virtue of section 1333 of Title 43, then
such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason
thereof, may bring an action against such vessel in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (b) of this section. Nothing contained in subsection
(b) of this section shall preclude the enforcement according to its terms of
any reciprocal indemnity provision whereby the employer of a person
entitled to receive benefits under this chapter by virtue of section 1333 of
Title 43 and the vessel agree to defend and indemnify the other for cost of
defense and loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from
death or bodily injury to their employees.
147. See Adams & Milhollin, supra note 6, at 73–74, citing generally to,
Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992).
148. See Adams & Milhollin, supra note 6, at 73–74.
149. Id. at 73.
150. “A fortiori” can be defined as: “Accepted Lat. Expression, short for a fortiori
causa (or ratione), meaning, ‘for a more forceful reason’, or ‘even more so.’” GÉRARD
CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 1 (2014). See also, “argument a fortiori,”
defined as:
[R]easoning consisting in applying the rule given in a text to a case not
contemplated by that text, because a reference to the ‘reason’ behind the rule
(ratio legis) makes it obvious that the rule offers even greater reasons to
apply to the case not expressly contemplated by the text. Id. at 56.
151. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 2009), citing to, Grand Isle
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 543 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Grand Isle
Panel”).
152. See Robertson, supra note 80, at 485–87.
153. If there is anything that has been historically treated as traditional maritime
activity, it is a vessel charter for the carriage of passengers over navigable waters. See
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866).
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enforceable against Seacor under general maritime law.154 By contrast, the
majority held that GIS’s contract with BP fell under OCSLA, nullifying the
indemnity provision owed by GIS.155 Both indemnity clauses acknowledged
all of BP’s other contractors and agreed to hold harmless “Company
Group”156 and “Contractor Group;”157 a clear representation of the parties’
intent to make indemnity reciprocal. But—as Professor Robertson previously
noted—a question arises if an employee of Seacor was injured allegedly by
the negligence of a GIS employee or representative.158 If a Seacor employee
had sued GIS, and GIS subsequently settled with the Seacor Employee, then
attempted to exercise the reciprocal indemnity provision, demanding
indemnity from Seacor, would GIS be able to enforce the indemnity clause
contained in Seacor’s contract? Yes, under the terms of the contract between
Seacor and BP. Whereas, after Grand Isle III, in the instance a GIS employee
(i.e., Denny Neil) sued Seacor, Seacor would be unable to enforce the
indemnity clause contained in GIS’s contract with BP. It is doubtful Congress
would have intended such an inequitable consequence of section 905(c). The
result being an obvious “blemish on the new regime.”159 However, consider
if instead the majority had looked at the entire contractual relationship—the
MMCSC, Vessel Charter, and work orders—as if each contract represented a
portion of a larger contract. Regardless of whether the focus-of-the-contract
called for, the application of OCSLA or maritime law, each party would have
been subjected to the same treatment—either full indemnity or none at all.
154. Reciprocal indemnity clauses that allocate liability to employers, regardless
of who was negligent, have been consistently upheld under general maritime law. See
e.g., Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1986); Fontenot v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986); Blanks v. Murco Drilling
Corp., 766 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1985).
155. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 789.
156. See Motion for Summary Judgment by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., Exhibit “BPart 1-3” Master Maintenance and Construction Services Contract, Art. 14 Indemnity,
Sec. 14.01.02, p.7, Gray Ins. Co., Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC,
No. 06-01405, 2007 WL 2874808, (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2007); see also Exhibit “C-Part
1” Vessel Charter, Art. 17 Indemnity, Sec. 17.01, et seq. (“‘Company Group’ means
the following entities and persons individually and collectively: Company and its
Affiliates, its co-venturers, co-lessees, co-working interest owners and their Affiliates,
and the officers, directors, employees, agents, and representatives of all those
entities.”).
157. See Motion for Summary Judgment by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., Gray Ins.
Co., Exhibit “B-Part 1-3” Master Maintenance and Construction Services Contract,
Art. 14 Indemnity, Sec. 14.01.03, p.7 Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC,
No. 06-01405, 2007 WL 2874808, (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2007); see also Vessel Charter,
Art. 17 Indemnity, Sec. 17.01, et seq. (“‘Contractor Group’ means the following
entities and persons individually and collectively: Contractor and its Affiliates, its
subcontractors and their Affiliates, and the officers, directors, employees, agents, and
representatives of all these entities.”).
158. See Robertson, supra note 80, at 485.
159. Id. at 487.
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E. Armijo and Tetra: Fresh Opportunity
Recently, the Fifth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to revisit
its holding in Grand Isle III. Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc.,160 was
appealed to the Fifth Circuit in 2015 and was taken up in Tetra
Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.161 This case is a classic
representation of the issue presented in Grand Isle III: a tort occurs on a
certain OCSLA situs; the contractual relationship involves indemnity
clauses; and the outcome depends on whether adjacent state law is
surrogated via OCSLA, or federal maritime law applies of its own force.
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the contract should be considered to
have arisen on an OCSLA situs. However, it is clear that both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit cannot sufficiently determine OCSLA situs
under Grand Isle III precedent.
In Armijo, numerous plaintiffs were injured while working to
dismantle a bridge between two oil production platforms.162 As directed
by their Tetra supervisors, the plaintiffs made a series of cuts on the
bridge’s supporting structures and attached nylon straps to hoist the bridge
and remove it to a barge below.163 After the first attempt to hoist the bridge
failed, Plaintiffs were instructed to go onto the bridge to determine what
else needed to be done to free it.164 While Plaintiffs were on the bridge, it
collapsed and, as a result, they tumbled some seventy to eighty feet into
the Gulf of Mexico.165 Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against Tetra and
Maritech Resources (Maritech). One plaintiff was an employee of Vertex
Services, LLC, (Vertex), against which Tetra and Maritech filed an
indemnity action (along with their insurer) pursuant to the Master Service
Agreement (MSA) entered into between Vertex and Tetra.166
The parties agreed to the district court’s application of the PLT test to
determine whether section 1333(a)(2)(A) applied.167 It then became evident
that the court was tasked with considering the problems of Grand Isle III; first
being the application of the focus-of-the-contract test. With Grand Isle III’s
holding that courts “should look to where the work is to be performed
pursuant to the specific work order,” the district court found itself in a
160. 936 F. Supp.2d 675 (E.D. La. 2013), appeal docketed, Tetra Technologies,
Inc., et. al. v. Vertex Services, LLC, No. 12-2667, 2015 WL 1810453 (E.D. La. April
20, 2015).
161. 814 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Tetra].
162. Armijo, 936 F. Supp.2d at 678.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 936 F. Supp.2d 675, 678–79 (E.D. La.
2013).
167. Id. at 680.

256

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

quandary as no formal work order was available for the court to examine.168
In a second effort to determine the focus of the contract, the district court
turned to other evidence indicating where the contract called for the work to
be performed, but ultimately found it “impossible to extrapolate this over the
duration of the work order.”169 And as expected, the MSA (or blanket
agreement) provided no guidance to the nature of the work.170 As a result, the
district court could not satisfy the first prong of PLT test.
On the second prong—because its inquiry now calls upon essentially
the same information as the first prong (nature and character)—the court
reached the same dead-end. Applying Davis, the district court stated that:
In short, there is insufficient evidence in the record here to
determine enough about the nature of [the] MSA and work order
even to make an informed analogy for purposes of determining
whether it is the type of contract traditionally regarded as
maritime. There is far from enough evidence to answer the six
questions of the Davis fact-specific inquiry.171
The court then moved to the third prong—whether state law was
inconsistent with federal law—and determined it was the only prong that
could be satisfied.172 The court found “no reason to depart from the
numerous decisions in which the Fifth Circuit has found that LOIA is not
inconsistent with federal law.”173 However, this does not solve the issue of
whether the indemnity clauses were enforceable. For it to be relevant
whether state law is inconsistent with federal law, state law must be found
applicable; therefore, since it was impossible to determine whether state
law was applicable, the third prong had no bearing on the issue.
Since the matter in Armijo was a motion for summary judgment, the
district court wisely made an analysis under an assumption that state law
would apply as surrogate law under OCSLA.174 This was merely to
determine whether LOIA (if applicable) would even nullify the indemnity
provision at all.175 Defendants argued that LOIA requires the contract at
issue to “pertain to a well,” and because this was a contract for the
dismantling of a “fully decommissioned” platform, it did not constitute a
“well” for purposes of LOIA.176 Moreover, the contract must only bear a
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 681, citing to, Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 787 n. 6.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 936 F. Supp.2d 675, 683 (E.D. La. 2013).
Id., citing, e.g., Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d at 789.
Armijo, 936 F. Supp.2d at 683–84.
Id.
Id. at 684–85.
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“nexus to a well” for LOIA to apply.177 The district court concluded that
“no evidence supporting the existence of a nexus to a well” was provided
and granted summary judgment against Vertex; therefore, the indemnity
agreements were enforceable.178
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary
judgment on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support a
summary judgment in favor of either party.179 For both the first and second
PLT prongs, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court and found that
no determination could be made with the evidence.180 However, the district
court was found to have incorrectly interpreted LOIA, concluding it would
not void the indemnity agreement between Tetra and Vertex, when in fact
it would void the agreement.181 According to the district court’s incorrect
interpretation of LOIA, determining the first two prongs of PLT was
unnecessary because the result would be the same—indemnity clause
upheld; judgment against Vertex. For this reason the Fifth Circuit reversed
and remanded instructing the district court to determine “whether
Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal law.”182 Essentially,
the district court was ordered to come to a definite determination for both
the first and second prong of PLT.
Critical to the determination of both the first and second PLT prongs
are the specific work orders the injured parties were operating under at the
time of the accident. Hence, the Fifth Circuit’s remand to reopen the case
to allow for introduction of more evidence, preferably specific work
orders.183 However, such work orders—for one reason or another—were
missing from the record; neither party submitted any evidence of a specific
work order.184 Potentially, such work orders may have been given
verbally, “from time to time as needed.”185 In which case, the district court
would once again be left as “helpless as a sailor cast on a desert rock.”186
Granted, these work orders would aid in the determination of the first and
177. Id. at 684, citing to, Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953
F.2d 985, 995 (5th Cir. 1992).
178. Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 936 F. Supp.2d 675, 685 (E.D. La. 2013).
179. Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins., Co., 814 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2016).
180. Id. at 738–42.
181. Id. at 742–46 (Part. II. B. “LOIA Would Void the Indemnity Agreement”)
(emphasis added).
182. Id. at 742.
183. Id. at 742 (“[W]e remand for the district court to determine the now
dispositive issue of whether Louisiana law must be adopted as surrogate federal
law.”).
184. Id. at 739; Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 936 F. Supp.2d 675, 681 (E.D.
La. 2013).
185. Armijo, 936 F. Supp.2d at 681.
186. William Wordsworth, The Female Vagrant, in Lyrical Ballads and Other
Poems 29, 34 (Martin Scofield ed., Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 2003) (1798).
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second prongs, even the Fifth Circuit panel held “the absence of a specific
work order is not fatal” to the party asserting that the controversy arose on an
OCSLA situs (the nullity of the indemnity clause).187 At best, these work
orders could provide evidence of where the work should be performed.188
Even if on remand the district court reopens the case to allow the
introduction of work order between Tetra and Vertex under which the
accident occurred, the court would still be taking into consideration the
other aspects of the contractual arrangement between the parties, i.e., the
MSA and Salvage Plan. This reaffirms the solution this comment presents
below, that the test should be an “all-inclusive, focus-of-the-contracts
test.”189 Regarding the absence of one piece of evidence as “not fatal,”
implies that the work order should just be another factor considered with
the rest of contracts, rather than the determining element.
Finally, with brevity, notice can be taken of the court’s silence on two
prevailing issues. First, that after Tetras, there is no mention of Kirby in Fifth
Circuit dialogue concerning jurisdiction disputes between OCSLA and
maritime.190 The second concerns the court’s fleeting concurrence that LOIA
is consistent with federal law.191 There is potential for argument that the
relationship between 33 U.S.C. section 905 and LOIA is not necessarily
consistent. Consistent with LOIA, section 905(b) of LHWCA prohibits
indemnity agreements between a covered maritime employer and a vessel
owner.192 However, section 905(c) removes the prohibition of indemnity
agreements when negligence of “a vessel causes injury to a person entitled to
receive benefits . . . by virtue of [OCSLA]”—seemingly inconsistent with
LOIA.193 The district court did not address this possible inconsistency, as it
187. Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. Cont’l Ins., Co., 814 F.3d 733, 739 (5th Cir.
2016).
188. Id. at 739 (citing ACE Am. Ins. Co., 699 F.3d at 831 (Tetra, note 18)
(emphasis added)).
189. See infra Part IV.
190. See supra Part III.B.1.
191. Tetra, 814 F.3d at 742.
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780(B):
Any provision contained in . . . or affecting an agreement pertaining to a
well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals . . . is void and
unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or does provide for defense
or indemnity, or either, to the indemnitee against loss or liability for
damages arising out of or resulting from death or bodily injury to
persons, which is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent
negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent,
employee, or an independent contractor who is directly responsible to
the indemnitee.
193. 33 U.S.C. § 905(c) (1984) (“Nothing contained in subsection (b) of this
section shall preclude the enforcement . . . of any reciprocal indemnity provision
whereby the employer of a person entitled to receive benefits under [OCSLA] and the
vessel agree to defend and indemnify the other for cost . . . ”).
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found that Vertex had not contracted with Tetra Technologies as a vessel
owner, which is a requisite for section 905(c) to apply.194
The Fifth Circuit was presented with a fresh, salty opportunity and
inadvertently reaffirmed the problems with Grand Isle III. However, the
issues have been prolonged. Whether the district court will discover sufficient
evidence to provide for the issue on remand is something the community will
have to wait for, but even then, the case still stands to be appealed once more.
IV. SOLUTION: AN ALL INCLUSIVE PACKAGE DEAL, RES NOVA
The suggested solution to filter some of Grand Isle III’s muddy-water is
three-fold: (1) abandon PLT, or at least recognize that the first and second
prongs are redundant after Grand Isle III; (2) update the maritime contract
jurisdiction test from Davis to Kirby; and (3) make the focus-of-the-contract
test inclusive of all contracts that form the entire contractual relationship at
issue, rather than examining each contract separately—a change from a
mutually exclusive “focus-of-the-contract” to an all-inclusive “focus-of-thecontracts” test.
By examining only the contract between GIS and BP, the majority in
Grand Isle III viewed the reciprocal contracts (GIS’s MMCSC with BP and
Seacor’s Vessel Charter with BP) as wholly separate and unrelated. As a
result, the reciprocity of the indemnity clauses was a nullity.195 If the majority
had applied the focus-of-the-contract test to all contracts relevant to BP’s
overall goal, then, regardless of whether the majority deemed the focus to arise
on an OCSLA situs or within maritime law, the same laws would have been
applied to both Seacor and GIS—affirming reciprocity, irrespective of the
validity of the indemnity clauses. Furthermore, this sustains Grand Isle III’s
efforts to correct the distinction of tort and contract issues presented in the
cases it overruled.196
If it is acknowledged that after Grand Isle III, the first and second factors
of the PLT test will produce the same results, there is an opportunity to create
a more efficient test. Courts should then answer both: whether the controversy
arises on an OCSLA situs and whether federal maritime law applies of its own
force. Nevertheless, under these contracts that position work-performance at

194. Armijo v. Tetra Technologies, 936 F. Supp.2d 675, 683 (E.D. La. 2013).
195. Grand Isle III, 589 F.3d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that GIS’s contract
with BP fell under OCSLA, nullifying the indemnity provision owed by GIS).
196. See supra note 10.
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a location on or above the OCS (past state submerged lands),197 the choiceof-law analysis for contractual disputes will lead only to either general
maritime law or whichever adjacent state law OCSLA applies.
The situation presented is rather particular, but occurs often on the OCS.
It includes a common party contracting with several contractors to satisfy one
need related to the exploration of oil and gas in an area with a nexus to the
OCS. The adoption of a test res nova specific to these circumstances is
reasonable. Positioning the court’s analysis from the viewpoint of the
common party, looking to the common party’s multiple contracts (that
effectuates a singular, overarching contractual relationship), will present a
mixed contract. This provides a launching point for the Fifth Circuit to adopt
the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Kirby. It follows then that the
Fifth Circuit should update its maritime contract regime. Professor Robertson
has proposed the following consolidation of an older Fifth Circuit case,
Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp.198 and Kirby:
So long as a contract’s substantial purpose is to effectuate oil or gas
drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel, it is a maritime contract.
Its character as a maritime contract is not defeated simply because it
also provides for obligations that are not related to the use of the
vessel.199
This test is favorable for several reasons. First, the test serves the indicia
of the courts in the Fifth Circuit to treat all of these special vessels (i.e., jackup rigs) involved in oil and gas exploration as essentially involved in a
maritime activity.200 This will enhance the predictability of oil and gas
contracts over the OCS. Second, although the test is characterized as a
maritime test, because it is broad and fundamentally seeks to determine nature
and character, it serves both the first and second factors of PLT—even more
so in lieu of Grand Isle III. Third, this test, as it is the brainchild of Kirby, does
not offend Grand Isle III’s efforts to remove the tort-based, fortuity element

197. Currently, state jurisdiction extends three geographical miles off the state’s
shores. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1953). However, legislation has been proposed to extend
this to nine nautical miles. H.R. 1663, 114th Cong. §103(a) (2015). For general
information about U.S. Maritime Limits and Boundaries, see OFFICE OF COAST
SURVEY, U.S. Maritime Limits & Boundaries (last visited Oct. 11, 2016),
nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm [https://perma.cc/3DU5-SVMR].
198. 783 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986).
199. Robertson, supra note 1, at 548.
200. Id. at 547.
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from contractual disputes.201 Accordingly, it furthers the focus-of-the-contract
test.
This comment’s contribution comes in addition to adopting Professor
Robertson’s proposed test.202 Applying the test in an all-inclusive manner and
from the viewpoint of the common party, the test will eliminate the
indemnification inequalities created by Grand Isle III.
Under Grand Isle III context, a foreseeable problem with a “focus-of-thecontracts” test is deciding the choice-of-law for an action arising from an
injury suffered by a seaman on a vessel. Considering that the Vessel Charter
between Seacor and BP, by itself, was undoubtedly a maritime contract, in the
event a court utilizing this proposed all-inclusive method deems the entire
contractual arrangement as arising under OCSLA, this could (improperly)
prevent vessel crew certain rights and remedies under maritime law.
Therefore, the application of this method would reasonably be restricted to
claims between the subcontractors of the common party (i.e., GIS and
Seacor). For any claims or disputes between a subcontractor and the common
party (i.e., GIS and BP, or Seacor and BP), courts should continue to apply
the focus of the particular contract between the common party and the
subcontractor.
CONCLUSION: TAKE IT WITH A GRAIN OF SALT
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have been applying the focus-of-thecontract test as it was established in Grand Isle III,203 but it is equally apparent
that the application of the test is flawed, as seen in Armijo and Tetra.
Removing the element of fortuity in a contractual dispute acutely serves the
ability of entities to predict legal consequences of their contract. When Grand
Isle III adjusted the first prong of the PLT test to distinguish tort from contract,
the majority made an attempt to facilitate the predictability of legal
consequence; however, it came at a cost. Where there are formidable policy
concerns of equal bargaining power that arise from the oil and gas indemnity
201. Kirby was specifically concerned with keeping the fortuity element out of
contract jurisdiction analysis. The court stressed that contract jurisdiction was
“conceptual rather than spatial.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004).
The ruling sought to correct the apparent problem with the lower courts applying tort
(spatial) analysis to resolve contract (conceptual) disputes. Id. at 15 (“Lower court
cases that appear to have depended solely on geography [where the tort occurred] in
fashioning a rule for identifying maritime contracts are inconsistent with the
conceptual approach required by this Court’s precedent.”).
202. Robertson, supra note 1, at 548.
203. See, e.g., Thibeaux v. Merit Energy Co., LLC, 920 F. Supp.2d 706, 710
(W.D. La. 2013); Patlan v. Apache Corp., No. 1:09-CV-926, 2010 WL 2293272, at
*4 (E.D. Tex. 2010); and W & T Offshore, Inc. v. Apache Corp., 918 F. Supp.2d 601,
609 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

262

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. V

clauses, and states have done their best to address these issues (i.e., LOIA),
Grand Isle III has undermined principles of equality by eradicating any
reciprocity of indemnity clauses on the OCS. Granted, the all-inclusive
“focus-of-the-contracts” test furthered by this comment may still afford the
courts a great deal of discretion in determining whether a contract lies in
maritime or under OCSLA. Admittedly, this does not necessarily lend itself
to legal predictability, but at the very least, it will ensure that all parties within
the same contractual network, or operating ensemble, are subject to the same
laws.
Developing a new test to address the issues of Grand Isle III will require
a coup of sorts—likely another en banc review. Equally plausible is the notion
that the answers may lie beyond Fifth Circuit science. At the time, Tetra
appeared to be the best chance for the Fifth Circuit to gather at the roundtable
and readdress its focus-of-the-contract test, but the issue lives to see another
day. Perhaps when the day comes practitioners will be served something with
“a more genuinely salty flavor.”204

Christopher B. Ortte*

204. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961).
* J.D./D.C.L., 2017, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
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